Military Deception

1. Military Deception

2. “When in doubt, tell the truth. It will confound your enemies and astound your friends.” Mark Twain "Though fraud in other activities may be detestable, in the management of war it is laudable and glorious, and he who overcomes the enemy by fraud is as much to be praised as he who does so by force." Machiavelli “All warfare is based on deception.” Sun Tzu

3. Deception: • “To deceive…” or “mislead by a false appearance or statement” • The Random House College Dictionary

4. Those measures designed to mislead the adversary by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to act in a manner prejudicial to his interests. Deception must be focused on the decision-maker Deception:

5. Military Deception … actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. FM 3-13 Information Operations Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

6. Deception becomes increasingly important as the force becomes lighter and more agile. Deception planning requires in-depth knowledge of the enemy decision maker and his decision-making processes. When employed, deception takes center stage. Considerations

7. Principles of Military Deception • Focus on the target • Cause the target to act • Centralize control • Employ variety • Enforce strict OPSEC • Minimize falsehood/leverage truth • Ensure timeliness • Ensure integration • Exploit target biases • Avoid windfalls • Use space effectively • Work within available competencies and resources

8. PASTBEHAVIOR OTHER VARIABLES Target Assessment DECISION MAKING STRUCTURE PSYCHOLOGICAL BIASES CULTURAL IMPACT Influences that affect perceptions

9. Make the adversary commander see the battlefield a certain way Based on biases, we seek to reinforce the adversary’s own ideas of reality Confuse, delay, or stop the O-O-D part of the OODA Loop Conditions the adversary Deception PhilosophyUses Perception Management

10. Support the Commander’s Mission & Concept of Operations Cause adversary to incorrectly employ forces Cause adversary to reveal strengths, weaknesses, dispositions and future intentions Overload adversary intelligence and analysis capability Condition adversary to patterns that can be exploited Cause adversary to waste combat power Deception’s Primary Goal (Cause the adversary to lose)

11. Subordinate Deception Objectives

12. Reinforcing a perception is easier than changing Use lots of truth Too much ambiguity can mask the story Sequence deception events to avoid saturation Give the story through a number of media Avoid windfall inputs Feedback increases the chances of success Plan for “what if?” Maxims to “Lie” By

13. FM 3-13…

14. No major operation should be undertaken without planning and executing appropriate deceptive measures... There should continue in being a nucleus of personnel capable of handling these arts in case an emergency arises. Dwight D. Eisenhower , June 19, 1947

15. Hide the Real Show the Fake Deception Techniques We use physical, technical, and administrative assets

16. Physical means include... • Reconnaissance unit operations. • Alert and movement of forces. • Training, testing, evaluation, and rehearsal activities. • Dummy and decoy equipment, devices, and displays (see FM 20-3). • Smoke and obscurants (see FM 3-50). • Logistic, stockpiling, and repair activities. • Feints, demonstrations, and ruses (see FM 3-90). • Sonic indicators reproduce common noises of military activity. Such noises are directed against adversary sound ranging sensors and the human ear. Sounds can be real or simulated. The deception plan may also require that the adversary not hear certain sounds; such instances require strict noise discipline. • Olfactory indicators project battlefield smells to deceive human and technical sensors. Examples of olfactory deception measures are the creation of odors common to military units and operations, such as those of food, explosives, and petroleum products. Deception Techniques (Physical)

17. Technical means include electromagnetic deception, sonic indicators, and olfactory indicators. Electromagnetic deception includes. Manipulative electronic deception. actions to eliminate revealing, or convey misleading, electromagnetic indicators. Simulative electronic deception. actions to simulate friendly, notional, or actual capabilities to mislead adversary forces. Imitative electronic deception. the introduction of electromagnetic energy into adversary systems that imitates adversary emissions. With the advent of advanced multi-spectral sensors mounted on air and space platforms, electromagnetic deception is growing more complex. However, its basic objective. to manipulate, falsify, or distort the electromagnetic signals received by adversary sensors. is unchanged (Electromagnetic deception is also a method of attack. See chapter 1). Deception Techniques (Technical)

18. Administrative means are resources, methods, and techniques to convey or deny oral, pictorial, documentary, or other physical evidence to the deception target. Examples of administrative means include planting bogus material. Deception Techniques (Administrative)

19. Ambiguity Increasing Heighten Adversary Decision Maker’s Uncertainty Delay Decisions Cause Incorrect Employment Ambiguity Decreasing Shapes Adversary’s Thinking Makes Very Certain of Chosen COA COA Completely Incorrect Two Approaches Difficult to Plan and Execute

20. Operational and Tactical Deception Influence Adversary Commander Targets the Decision Maker Support of OPSEC Degrade enemy’s Collection Capability Target Enemy’s Intelligence Function Support of Force Protection Prevent Observation Targets Sensors and Weapon Systems Purposes for Deception

21. Deception has greatest chance for success when in reinforces what the adversary decision-maker already believes. Deception requires sufficient resources to be credible. Deception requires time to plan, execute, and assess. Key Points

22. Limit Witting Participants Crosswalk with OPSEC Nest with OPLAN Budget Time Link Assessment with Execution Plan for Continuous Assessment Know when to Stop Plan to Exploit Success Expect the Unexpected Planning Techniques

23. Target Goal Objective Story Observables Executions Means Conduits Feedback Who is to be Deceived? To Accomplish what for us? Cause what Action? Portrayal of Scenario What Enemy Sees Tasks to Units Methods & Resources Enemy’s Collection Means Sense Response to Deception Planner’s Notes How will you collect & confirm?

24. Monitor Sensors Assess Intel Estimate Deception Process Deception Objective Decision & Execution Perception Formed Desired Perception Derive Indicators Deception Story Reconstruct Story Recognize Indicators Execute Events Observe Events

25. Deception Working Group Composition • Deception working groups (DWG), are formed based on the skills that are required to perform the mission. • Not every member of the staff is included • Composition is based solely upon need to know • OPSEC is a primary consideration.

26. Commander Chief of Staff Deception Officer G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 SJA PAO Planning Participants Position Participation Directs Witting Staff Lead Unwitting Witting Witting Unwitting Witting Witting Informed

27. Give Legitimate and Achievable Missions Keep Unaware of Deception Role? Provide Support at Appropriate Level Ensure They Contribute to Operation Prepare to Exploit Success Minimize Role Playing Executing Units

28. Quick Response Deception Planning Try to use Non-selected COA as basis for Deception Story (Existing Phase) Development and Wargaming Completed Staff is Onboard Meets the COA Criteria Tests; Supportable May Already be a Branch Plan Success can be Exploited Parallel Plan OPSEC Minimize Realignment of Forces Quick Response

29. Exercise Example A Sample Deception Operation

30. XX XXX X Terrain Rugged Compartmented Terrain Three Minor Avenues of Approach Rolling Terrain Multiple High-Speed Avenues of Approach

31. Target Goal Objective Story Observables Executions Means Conduits Feedback Opposing Division CDR Limit Resistance to Main Attack Enemy Concentrates in East Main Attack in East Rehearsals, Force Array Heavy BDE Attacks First Combat, CS and CSS Assets EAC, Corps and Div Sensors Enemy Moves to Defend in East The Plan

32. Observables Deception Events • D-180 Practice River Crossings, Covered in Division Newspaper • D-90 Practice River Crossings, Widespread Media Coverage • D-60 Reconnaissance of Roads, Assembly Areas, etc • D-30 Division CPX • D-2 Depart Garrison in RLS, Concentrate Forces in East 2 1 3 4 5

33. 6 6 6 8 7 7 7 Observables Deception Events • H-24 Plant Scouts for “Capture” • H-12 Portray Heavy Forward Movement in East (Sustainment) • H-HourRecon Squadron and HBCT Attack, Heavy Arty Fire and EW

34. MI MI XX XXX X X X D-1 Force Disposition Additional Facts • Entire Division Moved to Field Sites in Radio Listening Silence • Division had Organic Intel Assets, No Additional Intel Sources • Reinforcing MI BN(-) Equipped with Jammers • Compiled Personality Profiles of Key Opposing Force Players X X

35. XX MI MI XX XXX X X X Scheme of Maneuver D-Day X X

36. XX MI MI XX XXX X F F X X X X Scheme of Maneuver D-Day

37. … those efforts to negate, neutralize, diminish the effects of, or gain advantage from a foreign deception operation. Counter-Deception • Depends on intelligence operations to contribute to awareness of the adversary • Can ensure friendly decision makers are aware of adversary deception activities in orderto take appropriate action

38. Is our perception consistent with the most obvious and reasonable ways the adversary may act? Was information received from normal channels? Can it be corroborated? What is missing? Who tells the King he has no clothes? Counter-Deception Questions

39. Intelligence personnel should seek philosophical help from staff deception experts Devil’s advocate: Try to strip our biases Every deception has cracks and seams Be wary of windfalls Small bits of information are usually unreliable Counter-Deception Tips

40. Understand the Opposing Commander Know his Decision-Making Process Plan Deception in more Detail Identify Conflicts during Mini-Wargaming Understand Capabilities of his Collectors Build a Reserve of Indicators Monitor his Collectors Coalition Forces add to Uncertainty Lessons Learned