Scenarios for 2013

1. ICCM November 13, 2012 Scenarios for 2013

2. Context • Although the Government and the popular committees have managed to pressure AnsarAlSharia out of Zinjibar and Khanfar districts; the situation continues to be fragile in the whole Southern governorates. • In Aden and Lahj, the government is losing more territories for non-state groups, tribes, activists and political movements. • The presence of the semi-militia popular committees, as a new phenomenon in the South, is of concern as the government has no control over their activities and they have no discipline and hierarchy in place. • More radical groups within AlHirak are advocating for establishing a military wing to actively work for cessation. The relationship within Al-Hirak and between Al-Islah party is becoming more tense.

3. AnsarAlSharia is continuing to be actively engaged in attacks which are targeting popular committee figures and governmental personnel. These attacks are becoming more severe and with a spillover effect to the rest of the country. • Although IDPs are starting to return, there is growing tension between different groups within Abyan itself, mainly between IDPs, returnees and war affected people. • The slow restoration to the basic services is creating frustration within the local community in Abyan that will lead to more hostilities. • In Aden, more pressure is being placed on the already weak basic services; with no recovery plan in the near future. • The influx of refugees and migrants in the South will increase the complexity in the South; which will lead to more conflicts and tension.

4. Most likely scenarios • The North-South tension will result in the eruption of more active conflict between different groups which will be negatively reflected on the social tolerance and coherence. • The engagement of most of Al-Hirak groups in the national dialogue will not be materialized; even the moderist groups will be constrained by the radical ones from joining the dialogue. • Al-Hirak will concrete their attempts to establish a military wing and will capitalize on the popular committees already present in the some of the Southern governorates. • More mass demonstrations/protests are anticipated to take place consequently leading to more assassinations, personal attacks and damages to public/private properties.

5. Ansar Al-Sharia will intensify their activities by planning more coordinated terrorist attacks; which may go beyond the government and popular committees targeting. • The absence of government control over the Southern governorates sets a ground for instability, insecurity and criminality; hence more human rights and IHL violations will be witnessed. • A partial breakdown of basic services is anticipated which will increase frustration of the local people leading to protests/demonstrations.

6. Humanitarian Implications • Limitations in the access of humanitarian personnel and assistance to affected areas • Limited access will force many agencies to slow down their humanitarian interventions which will negatively affect the community perception of humanitarian work • Government will be unable to maintain the already fragile basic and social services which will further deteriorate these services. • More severe protection concerns will be witnessed in the conflict areas resulting in an increase in the violations of human rights and IHL (protection of civilians)

7. With the increase in tension in the South, there will pockets of displacement throughout the Southern governorates . • Insecurity and criminality will limit the number of international staff and relocation may be considered. • Since LNGOs in Yemen are perceived to have a political agenda, they will be seen as a legitimate target by some of the conflicting groups and as a result that will limit the humanitarian action.