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Based on CShapes (Weidmann, Kuse , Gleditzsch 2010).

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  1. 10 Years after the ‘Big Bang’ EU Enlargement – An assessment of the causes and consequences of Eastern enlargement and an outlook during times of multiple crisesBaltisch-Deutsches HochschulkontorUniversity ofLatvia, Facultyof Economics and Management, Room 50431/03/2014Dirk Leuffen (Dirk.Leuffen@uni-konstanz.de)

  2. Based on CShapes (Weidmann, Kuse, Gleditzsch 2010).

  3. EU Enlargement Research (selection) DEEPENING VS. WIDENING…?

  4. Group Size (Public Choice)

  5. Group Size (Public Choice)

  6. Club Theory(Buchanan 1965) Increaseofgroupsize -> Crowdingcosts -> Fewerincentivestocontributetoproduction ofpublicgoods

  7. Collective Action (Olson 1965) Increaseofgroupsize -> More incentivesforfreeriding -> Fewer incentivesto contribute to production of public goods

  8. Non-cooperative Game Theory(cf. z.B. Hardin 1971; Bonacich et al. 1976) Increaseofgroupsize -> Lessinformationaboutotherplayers -> Lesscooperativebehavior

  9. Transaction CostApproaches(cf. Buchanon & Tullock 1962) Increaseofgroupsize -> Growingcomplexity -> Growingtransactioncosts -> Efficiency isdiminished Source: Jensen, Hertz & Leuffen (2009)

  10. Veto Player Theory(Tsebelis 2002) Increaseofgroupsize -> Growingheterogeneity (per assumption) -> Increaseofpolciystability SQ

  11. Group Size (Public Choice)

  12. Expectations Eastern Enlargement • Kerremans (1998)/Dobbinset al. (2004): SQ-biasdue togrowingheterogeneityat least in specificpolicyareas • Zimmer et al. (2005): Growingconflictbetweennetcontributorsandnetreceivers • König & Bräuninger (2000): reduceddecision-makingcapacities, depending on MS preferences • König & Bräuninger (2004): Growingcores in theagriculturalsector • Tsebelis & Yatanagas (2000): Increaseofpolicy-stability • König & Schulz (2000): Riseoftransactioncostsleadstoslowing down ofdecision-making • Scharpf (2006): More ofthejoint-decision-trap • ExceptionSteunenberg (2002): Enlargementresistantpropertyunder QMV

  13. GenerelExpectation More Gridlock: Growingpolicy-stability after enlargement!

  14. EmpiricalFindings Results on thepolicy-makingprocess • Nomore negative votes (cf. Mattila 2009; Hagemann 2008) • Only partial re-orderingofactorconstellations (cf. Thomson 2009, 2011; Veen 2011; Naurin & Lindahl 2008; Plechanovova 2011) • Slowing down effects (cf. König & Schulz 2000; Hertz & Leuffen 2011; ≠ Golub 2007) • Continuity in EP andCommission (cf. Hix & Noury 2009; Peterson & Birdsall 2009)

  15. System Production(Hertz & Leuffen) • Analysis of EU legislative output (countmodels) • PreLex 1976-2009 (EUR-Lex; Council summaries) • Nogeneralreductionof legislative output after enlargementrounds (not even in CAP and CFP) • But: slightreductionofdirectives! OVERALL: WHY SO MUCH CONTINUITY?

  16. Group Size in Sociology

  17. Group Size in Sociology

  18. Oligarchization • Network analysesshowslightincrease in concentration • Link tooutputs, however, ratherunclear • Models showthattheinfluenceofbigstatesisrather limited

  19. Formalization • No strong evidenceforformalization; e.g. increasinguseof „trilogues“ • But: institutionalresponse; e.g. reformtreaties & reformofCouncil Rules ofProcedure (abolishmentoftour de table)

  20. Adaptation • Newcomers adoptexistingdecision-makingbehavior • Mechanismsofsocialinfluence (Johnston 2001)? • Consensualdecision-makingis still therule after enlargement

  21. Heterogeneity • Assumptionofgrowingheterogeneityof MS preferences after enlargement… • Structural-variables (GDP, occupationalstructure, history…) suggestmoretensions…

  22. Preferencesin theenlargedEU „DEU II“ (withR. Thomson & J. Arregui) • Expert interviewstomeasurepreferencesandsaliencesof EU memberstates • 152 controversialissues/ 56 legislative proposals after enlargement • „lowpolitics“ • Scale ranging from 0 to100

  23. Counterfactual Analysis Whatif…? Howwouldthe EU havedecided in the „goodolddays“?

  24. Model • Model asapproximationofreality in orderto „rerunhistory“ • Compromise-model (van den Bos 1991; Achen 2006) (= inst. Realism; approximationof Nash bargainingsolution)

  25. Example 0 50 100 COM (2006) 373 (2006/0132/COD)ISSUE 71 Proposal for a directive establishing a framework for Community action to achieve a sustainable use of pesticides (COD/2006/132) Issue 1 1. Areal spraying of crops (cf. art. 9 of COM-proposal) Permit spraying throughout Europe under certain conditions specified in the directive Prohibit spraying but allow member states to derogate under certain conditions Prohibit spraying throughout Europe

  26. Compromise-Model ISSUE 71 Proposal for a directive establishing a framework for Community action to achieve a sustainable use of pesticides (COD/2006/132) 1. Areal spraying of crops 0: Permit spraying throughout Europe under certain conditions specified in the directive 50: Prohibit spraying but allow member states to derogate under certain conditions 100: Prohibit spraying throughout Europe

  27. Compromise-Model ISSUE 71 Proposal for a directive establishing a framework for Community action to achieve a sustainable use of pesticides (COD/2006/132) 1. Areal spraying of crops 0: Permit spraying throughout Europe under certain conditions specified in the directive 50: Prohibit spraying but allow member states to derogate under certain conditions 100: Prohibit spraying throughout Europe

  28. Counterfactual EU 15 ISSUE 71 Proposal for a directive establishing a framework for Community action to achieve a sustainable use of pesticides (COD/2006/132) 1. Areal spraying of crops 0: Permit spraying throughout Europe under certain conditions specified in the directive 50: Prohibit spraying but allow member states to derogate under certain conditions 100: Prohibit spraying throughout Europe

  29. Counterfactual EU 12 ISSUE 71 Proposal for a directive establishing a framework for Community action to achieve a sustainable use of pesticides (COD/2006/132) 1. Areal spraying of crops 0: Permit spraying throughout Europe under certain conditions specified in the directive 50: Prohibit spraying but allow member states to derogate under certain conditions 100: Prohibit spraying throughout Europe

  30. Counterfactual EU 10 ISSUE 71 Proposal for a directive establishing a framework for Community action to achieve a sustainable use of pesticides (COD/2006/132) 1. Areal spraying of crops 0: Permit spraying throughout Europe under certain conditions specified in the directive 50: Prohibit spraying but allow member states to derogate under certain conditions 100: Prohibit spraying throughout Europe

  31. Counterfactual EU 9 ISSUE 71 Proposal for a directive establishing a framework for Community action to achieve a sustainable use of pesticides (COD/2006/132) 1. Areal spraying of crops 0: Permit spraying throughout Europe under certain conditions specified in the directive 50: Prohibit spraying but allow member states to derogate under certain conditions 100: Prohibit spraying throughout Europe

  32. Counterfactual EU 6 ISSUE 71 Proposal for a directive establishing a framework for Community action to achieve a sustainable use of pesticides (COD/2006/132) 1. Areal spraying of crops 0: Permit spraying throughout Europe under certain conditions specified in the directive 50: Prohibit spraying but allow member states to derogate under certain conditions 100: Prohibit spraying throughout Europe

  33. Procedurecounterfactualanalysis • Per issue: 6 predictionsgenerated (EU27 to EU6) • Comparisonofpredictionandactualmeasuredoutcome • Average differencefor EU6 to EU27 over ALL issues 3b. Disaggregationintopolicyareas (Harm., Reg., Redistr.) • Comparisonofdistancebetweenmodelpredictionsandreferencepoint (mostly SQ) over different groupsizes QUESTION: Do enlargementroundsleadto SQ-bias?

  34. Performance Mean Absolute Errors (=average errors of model predictions to measured output)

  35. Performance Mean Absolute Errors (=mean errors of model predictions to measured output)

  36. Performance Mean Absolute Errors (=average errors of model predictions to measured output)

  37. SQ Bias? Average distanceofmodelpredictiontoreferencepoint; N = 152.

  38. SQ Bias? Average distance of model prediction to reference point

  39. SQ Bias? Average distanceofmodelpredictiontoreferencepoint

  40. Boxplots: distanceto RP

  41. Caveats • Measurement of ideal points? • AnticipationofCommission? Enlargedorchestraplays a different tune… • Validityofcompromisemodel: ispredictivecapacitysufficiently strong?

  42. Administrative capacity? Overall salience means and predicted values for each country based on DEU II (source Leuffen, Malang & Woerle 2014).

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