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BRITISH COLUMBIA ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT LAW NOVEMBER 26, 2012. Overview. Environmental Assessment Act - Elements Environmental Assessment Act – Issues BC Auditor General Report Northwest Institute Report comparing Federal/Provincial EAs for Prosperity Mine.
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BRITISH COLUMBIA ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT LAW NOVEMBER 26, 2012
Overview • Environmental Assessment Act - Elements • Environmental Assessment Act – Issues • BC Auditor General Report • Northwest Institute Report comparing Federal/Provincial EAs for Prosperity Mine
Environmental Assessment Act • Environmental Assessment Act (EAA) passed in 1994, amended in 2002 • Environmental Assessment Office (EAO) established under EAA to provide “open, accountable and neutrally administered process” to assess “reviewable projects” • Reviewable Projects Regulation identified projects to be reviewed (energy, mining, industry)
Purposes • “promote sustainability by protecting the environment and fostering a sound economy and social well-being” • “prevent or mitigate adverse effects of reviewable projects” • Repealed in 2002 amendments
Key Elements • Projects reviewable by virtue of regulation, EAO executive director discretion, ministerial order • Reviewable projects not be constructed without provincial EA certificate • EAO reviewable project determination • EAO makes order on scope, procedures, methods for project EA • Proponent proposes terms of reference for EAO approval
Key Elements • Proponent assembles required information and public input, applies for EA certificate • EAO reviews application and assessment report for two or more ministers with jurisdiction • Ministers decide to issue certificate, specify conditions, or refer for further assessment
Key Elements (1994) • Mandatory project committees to advise ministers (provincial, federal, municipal, regional, First Nations representatives) • Public advisory committee to make recommendations to project committee • Mandatory public notice provisions at each of four EA process stages • Environmental Assessment Board to conduct hearings on projects referred by Ministers
Key Amendments (2002) • Provided decision-making flexibillity for EAO and Ministers (“less regimented” “more timely and cost-efficient”) • Mandatory project committees replaced by working groups with reduced role • Public advisory committees eliminated • Public consultation mainly by proponent • Mandatory public notice provisions replaced by policy guidance
Reviewable Project Regulations • Coal Mine – 100,000 t/yr (1994), 250,000 t/yr (2002) • Mineral Mine - 25,000 t/yr (1994), 75,000 to/yr (2002) • Energy Project - 20 MW (1994), 50 MW (2002) • Urban Transit Rail - 8 km (1994), 20 km (2002)
Implications of Thresholds for Reviewable Project Regulations • Vancouver Airport Light Rail Project would not have been reviewed (less than 20km) • BC Energy Plan opened up hydro development to private sector • January 2009 – 145 water power licences plus 621 applications (many at 49MW); only 25 subject to BC EA process
Key Issues • Project Thresholds • Links to land use planning, strategic EA • Adequacy of public participation • Suitability of EA to meet Crown consultation responsibilities • Rigour of Process
Prosperity Mine • Proponent Taseko re-activated BC EA process in 2002, federal process in 2006 • RAs: DFO, Transport Canada, NRCan • DFO referred project to Environment Minister for panel review in February 2007 • BC decided to proceed with provincial review in June 2008 not joint panel review • Environment Minister referred to federal review panel in January 2009
Prosperity Mine • EA processes conducted separately with province approving project before federal panel review completed • BC approved mine; feds rejected mine on recommendation of federal panel • Why different findings and conclusions?
Comparison of BC and Federal EA Processes • Analysis by Northwest Institute July 2011 • BC EAO “only one significant adverse effect” “limited to a discrete location” loss of fish and fish habitat at Fish Lake/Little Fish Lake • BC ministers advised adverse effects justified by “very significant employment and economic benefits” and proponent’s fish habitat compensation program
Comparison of BC and Federal EA Processes • Federal panel found eight additional significant eight adverse effects: grizzly bears, navigation ,local tourism, grazing, First Nation’s trapline, First Nations’ traditional land use and cultural heritage, Aboriginal rights, future generations. • Proponent’s fish habitat compensation program not viable, mitigation not sufficient
Comparison of BC and Federal EA Processes • Why divergent outcomes? • Process: BC “review and comment” process vs. federal panel hearings • Information: Federal panel had more complete information (DFO, First Nations) • Expertise: Federal panel members highly qualified (chair with 27 years experience); EAO four staff on working group
Comparison of BC and Federal EA Processes • Participant Funding – feds yes; BC no • Significance Determination - EAO used large geographic area as baseline; feds, CEA Agency guidelines • Mitigation: BC lacked clear mitigation and compensation policies, deferred to future planning efforts; feds “no net loss” fish habitat policy
Comparison of BC and Federal EA Processes • Standards and Criteria: BC lacks standards/criteria to guide decision-making comparable to Fisheries Act/SARA • Legislation: BC Environmental Assessment largely procedural, lacked many substantive aspects of CEAA • Independence: Federal Panel independent unlike EAO Working Group
Comparison of BC and Federal EA Processes • Federal panel found eight additional significant eight adverse effects: grizzly bears, navigation,local tourism, grazing, First Nation’s trapline, First Nations’ traditional land use and cultural heritage, Aboriginal rights, and future generations. • Proponent’s fish habitat compensation program not viable, mitigation not adequateWhat accounts for such divergent outcomes? This report reviews and evaluates the • provincial and federal EA processes as they are disclosed in the record provided by the • BC EAO and Federal Review Panel. It concludes that the major differences between the • two processes may be understood by the following differences: • 1. Process: The BC EAO process involved information meetings and a “review and • comment” period in 2009, based on Taseko Mines Ltd.’s initial application. By • contrast, the Federal Review Panel required further information from Taseko • 1 Recommendations of the Executive Director, December 17, 2009, p.22. • Prosperity Mine EA Comparison Report, p.4 • and, once the information base was found to be adequate, held public hearings • in early 2010. This led to more informed discussion from all sides. • 2. Information: The two different EA processes, and the timing of decisionmaking, • meant that the Federal Review Panel (and hence federal Cabinet) had • more complete information upon which to base their analysis. For example, the • EAO did not wait for critical information from Fisheries and Oceans Canada, and • from First Nations and their expert advisors, leading to deficiencies in the factual • record placed before the provincial ministers. • 3. Expertise: The Federal Review Panel was highly qualified, with each of its • members being impact assessment professionals with experience of mining • projects. In addition, federal agencies such as Fisheries and Oceans Canada • brought considerable expertise to evaluation of the viability of proposed • compensation measures (e.g. man-made Prosperity Lake), and participant • funding provided by the Federal Review Panel enabled a form of peer review on • several aspects of the project, neither of which were available at the time the • Province approved the project. The provincial Assessment Report discloses four • EAO staff on the working group for the assessment but does not indicate their • qualifications or areas of expertise. • 4. Significance Determinations: A key difference between the BC EAO and • Federal Review Panel is how each assessed the significance of predicted adverse • effects. Many of the impacts found to be significant by the Federal Review Panel • were dismissed as insignificant by the EAO by measuring them against a large • geographic area, in some cases the whole Cariboo-Chilcotin region. By contrast, • the Federal Review Panel adopted established significance determination policies • developed by the Canadian Environmental Assessment Authority. Some adverse • effects found by the Federal Review Panel were not evaluated by the BC EAO. • 5. Mitigation and Compensation: BC lacks clear mitigation and compensation • policies, leaving the EAO somewhat rudderless when it comes to significance • determinations because each and every adverse effect becomes an opportunity • for negotiation. The BC Ministry of Environment developed broadly worded • objectives and “performance measures” to guide compensation for the loss of • Fish Lake, but key issues were deferred to future planning efforts. By contrast, • the Federal Review Panel and Fisheries and Oceans Canada were guided by a • long-established “no net loss” policy for the destruction of fish habitat. A July • 2011 audit by the BC Auditor General recommends that the EAO “work with the • Ministry of Environment to finalize a policy framework that will provide provincial • guidance on environmental mitigation.” • 6. Standards and Criteria: For many environmental values there are no • standards or criteria to guide decision-making in BC provincial legislation, such as • those found in Canada’s Fisheries Act and Species at Risk Act. This is leads to • Prosperity Mine EA Comparison Report, p.5 • significance determinations that are highly subjective and malleable. In this • assessment, the BC EAO dismissed wildlife-related concerns expressed by the • provincial Ministry of Environment and missed significant adverse cumulative • effects to the threatened South Chilcotin grizzly bear population. • 7. Legislation: The BC Environmental Assessment is largely procedural and lacks • many of the substantive aspects of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act • (CEAA). Key impact assessment concepts and terminology are not addressed or • defined in the provincial legislation. There are no decision-making criteria such • as those that guide responsible authorities under CEAA. • 8. Independence: The independence of the Federal Review Panel may account • for some of the differences in the outcomes. Given that the EAO found no • significant adverse effects to anything other than fish and fish habitat in the face • of strong evidence to the contrary, the question inevitably arises as to whether • the reporting relationship of the EAO to the relevant provincial ministers subtly or • indirectly affects its judgment, objectivity and neutrality.
Report of BC Auditor General on BC EAO July 2011 • Focused on post-certification • EAO’s oversight of certified projects not sufficient to ensure that potential significant effects are avoided/mitigated • EAO not ensuring that: • certificate commitments are measureable, enforceable • monitoring responsibilities are clearly defined • compliance and enforcement actions are effective
Report of BC Auditor General on BC EAO • EAO not evaluating effectiveness of environmental assessment mitigation measures to ensure projects are achieving desired outcomes • EAO not making appropriate monitoring, compliance and outcome information available to public to ensure accountability