David Johnston, Sara McBride Joint Centre for Disaster Research GNS Science / Massey University

1. Recent experience of a rapid assessment exercise • What happened? • What could be done differently in hindsight? David Johnston, Sara McBrideJoint Centre for Disaster ResearchGNS Science / Massey University

2. Policy Practice Research

4. Case studies • Ruahehu eruptions 1995-1997 • Ohura floods 1998 • Te Anau earthquake 2003 • Waikato Weather Bomb 2002 • Manawatu floods 2004 • Bay of Plenty floods 2004 • Indian Ocean tsunami 2004 • Matata debris flow 2005 • Kaitaia floods 2006 • Canterbury snow storm 2006 • Samoa tsunami 2009 • Canterbury earthquake 2010 and 2011

5. Hawke’s Bay 1931

7. Ohakune risk perceptions and economic impacts, following the 1995-96 Ruapehu eruptions • Surveyed risk perception compared to economic impacts • Three employment groups found • Risk perception varied between groups

8. Community: Employment Group Vulnerability Low Hazard Effects Ash fall lahar Agriculture Low Risk Perception Non Participation in Mitigation Low Risk Perception Low Independent income High Winter Sports High Risk perception Photo courtesy of I. Nairn Ruapehu: Perceived vulnerability & risk

9. 2002 Weather bomb June 2002 Coromandel

10. Summary of economic impacts • $8M Insured loss • $2.1M Uninsured loss • $3.1M Response agency costs • TOTAL: $13.2M = DIRECT COSTS cf. TCDC industry output $1031M, household consumption $398M source: NZIER/GNS • INDIRECT COSTS: • Negligible business disruption costs • Negligible flow-on impacts at a regional scale • $0.5M Insurance excess payments • SOCIAL / INTANGIBLE COSTS ?

11. Core principles of an effective recovery process • Community-based and community involvement • Coordination/integration • Mediation • Training/professional development and support • Flexibility • Sharing information

13. Natural Hazards Research Platform Natural Hazards Research Platform Natural Hazards Research Platform

14. A tale of two earthquakes – the Canterbury sequence of 2010-2011

17. Social and psychosocial impacts

18. EOC Science Liaison Desk - post 22 Feb

19. Communicating the knowledge • Crucially depends on: • relationships (are hard to develop at times of crisis) • relationships (can quick start integrated response & recovery) • relationships (already provide a clear understanding of goals, roles & • responsibilities by both parties) • trust (comes with time - MOU’s and the like provide a good starting point) • the right language (must be geared to how the message is received) • addressing the users needs, not the researchers curiosity • (there is a time for fundamental research but not during response and • early recovery activity) • timeliness (decisions will be made with or without the research • knowledge – better an imperfect contribution than no contribution) Natural Hazards Research Platform

20. What themes of rapid assessment were performed in CHCH by the agencies ? i.e. MSD doing welfare rapid assessment or EQC doing housing rapid assessment What are some key learnings from the assessment teams? Were there community-based assessment teams who self selected and assisted with the welfare assessment? If so, how was this managed?

21. Were there gaps in either localities or demographics discovered later on in the assessment team projects? How were these identified and what steps were taken to fill the gaps?

22. Was there anything that could have assisted teams in their assessment process? Was information provided by assessment teams to people? If so, was this information useful? What information could have been more useful?