The Cold War Questions of the Day

1. The Cold WarQuestions of the Day Daniel W. Blackmon IB HL History Coral Gables Sr. High

2. Question of the Day • "It is evident that the conflict after 1947 between the United States and the Soviet Union was not simply a clash of ideologies but a struggle of competing interests . . . .

3. Question of the Day • the forces bringing the two countries into collision as world powers would have operated in much the same way if the Bolshevik revolution had never occurred." • How far do you agree with this claim? (1985) (HL/SL)

4. Key Terms • “not simply a clash of ideologies but a struggle of competing interests . . . . “ • “How far do you agree . . . “

5. Thesis • This is a good question in that it may easily and convincingly be argued both pro and con.

6. Thesis • “Although some kind of clash of competing interests between the United States and the Soviet Union was inevitable, the nature and length of that conflict was determined more by ideological considerations than by any other factor.”

7. Thesis • As American historian John Spanier has pointed out, a bipolar world is inherently an unstable world. Furthermore, Louis Halle has asserted that the dramatically different historical experiences of the two nations has conditioned how each responded to the post-War world.

8. Thesis • However, George Kennan’s argument in the Long Telegram, that the policies of the Soviet Union were profoundly determined by its particular ideological Weltanschauung, has been affirmed by the verdict of history.

9. Thesis • When the ideological party-state of the Soviet Union collapsed, the Cold War came to an end. It is Soviet Bolshevism which has passed into the “dustbin of history.”

10. Outline of Ideas • Spanier and bipolarity • Halle and differing experiences • Kennan and the Long Telegram

11. John Spanier • “In the state system [of conducting foreign policy], each member . . . Tends to feel a high degree of insecurity. In the absence of a world government that could govern and safeguard it, each state knows that it can depend on no one but itself for its own preservation and safety.

12. “Self protection is the only protection in an essentially anarchical system; understandably, states tend to regard one another as potential adversaries, menaces to one another’s territorial integrity and political independence.

13. In short, the very nature of the state system breeds feelings of insecurity, distrust, suspicion, and fear. . . . “ (1)

14. John Spanier • “Enhancing one’s power relative to that of a possible foe becomes a principal means of reducing one’s own insecurity. . . . Power politics stems from each state’s continuous concern for its security.” (1)

15. “. . . It is easy to understand why in these circumstances states pursue a balance of power policy. A balance or equilibrium would make victory in a war less probable for an opponent and certainly very costly in comparison with any possible gains.

16. “Logically, therefore, a balance is presumed to be that distribution of power most likely to deter attack.” (2) • “The fundamental assumption underlying the state system is that its members cannot be trusted with power since they will be tempted to abuse it.” (2)

17. John Spanier • “The strategy of any nation in the state system is—or should be—to oppose any state that seeks predominance since this would constitute a threat to its security and independence.” (4)

18. A bipolar world is inherently unstable because even small shifts in relative power are perceived as very threatening.

19. Louis Halle • Louis Halle, in his classic The Cold War as History, regarded Russian history as primary and communism as incidental. (12)

20. John Spanier • Russia has no clear cut geographical boundaries, and has historically been open to repeated invasion • Eisenstein’s great film, Alexander Nevsky, celebrates a historical victory over the Teutonic Knights. Its pertinence to the threat posed by Adolf Hitler is not coincidence.

21. Russia survived only by a brutal militaristic rule that subordinated everything to survival itself.

22. Ivan the Terrible enserfed the peasants to provide the labor necessary, and broke the power of the nobles for the same reason. • Michael Romanov began a dynasty that fought Swedes, Poles, and Turks • Peter the Great defeated the Swedes and began to force a turn toward the increasingly technological West.

23. John Spanier • Russia become and remained a closed society, xenophobic, and aggressively expansionist in self-defense (Halle 12-19) • (do unto others before they do it unto you)

24. The US experience has been conditioned by a struggle with nature, not with Man. • The Atlantic and Pacific Ocean make us virtually invulnerable to invasion, and provided a security denied European nations • For the US, peace was normal, war abnormal.

25. George Washington had expressed our orientation in his Farewell Address: “The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign Nations, is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little Political connection as possible.”

26. John Spanier • James Monroe with the Monroe Doctrine had emphasized this separation: “The political system of the European powers is essentially different . . . from that of America.”

27. Following the end of the war, the US refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, join the League of Nations, and turned its back on Woodrow Wilson’s dream of a universalist, democratic world government that would preserve peace. The isolationist impulse was far too strong.

28. The nation’s slogan became “Back to Normalcy,” which meant making money and ignoring the outside world politically • Most Revisionist historians are strongly influenced by isolationism; involvement in the world at large is immoral, demeaning, and distracts us from reforming ourselves.

29. John Spanier • Neither US political leaders (Woodrow Wilson or Franklin Delano Roosevelt, for instance) nor the American public were comfortable with power politics.

30. Louis Halle • Like Spanier, Halle sees two nations whose experiences were so different that misunderstandings and conflicts were inevitable. • The question is, would they have consituted the Cold War as we experienced it?

31. Stalin’s Foreign Policy Objectives • Molotov, in Berlin in November 1940, responded to Ribbentrop’s overtures] with "a long monologue in which he repeated the well-known Soviet aspirations in Finland, Southern Bukovina and the Dardanelles Straits.

32. Molotov in Berlin Molotov wanted German troops out of Finland, and Japan to renounce her concession rights to coal and iron in North Sakhalin. He further proposed that the Soviet Union should issue a guarantee to Bulgaria, similar to that given by Germany to Rumania,

33. Molotov in Berlin with the additional right to set up bases capable of controlling movement through the Turkish Straits. . . . [Later that night] Molotov revealed his secondary spheres of interest, which included Greece, Yugo-Slavia, Hungary and Poland and the control of the Baltic Sea." (Seaton 13) (emphasis added)

34. Stalin’s Foreign Policy Goals • December 1941, Stalin asked Anthony Eden to recognize Soviet territorial gains which resulted from the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. (McCauley Origins 37-8)

35. Stalin’s Foreign Policy Goals • Stalin’s creation of an empire in Eastern and Central Europe thus represents long-term foreign policy goals, and may be seen as part of traditional Russian expansionism rather than Communist universalism.

36. Stalin and Katyn • Stalin arrested some 14,000 Polish officers when he occupied eastern Poland in 1939 • At least 4,000 of them were executed in the Katyn Forest and buried in a mass grave

37. Stalin and Katyn • The Germans discovered the bodies in 1943 and brought in the Red Cross to prove Soviet atrocities • )Stalin claimed the Germans did it

38. Stalin and Katyn The London Polish government-in-exile accused Stalin of the crime. Stalin used this as a pretext to establish his puppet Lublin Government as the “government” of Poland on July 2, 1944. The issue for Stalin was really Soviet control of a post war Poland.

39. Stalin and Katyn • Any government in Poland which represented the wishes of the Polish people would be adamantly anti-Soviet. Stalin could not permit this. • He murdered the officers in order to decapitate the ruling class in Poland and nip any organized resistance in the bud

40. Stalin and Katyn • When the Polish Home Army rose in revolt (August 1, 1944) as the Red Army approached Warsaw, Stalin halted his offensive and sat idly while the Germans systematically massacred the defenders.

41. Stalin and Katyn • )Stalin also blocked all efforts by the US and Britain to airlift supplies to the hard-pressed Poles. • )The Germans were killing the anti-Soviet leadership for him.

42. Stalin and Katyn • )In 1945, leaders in the Polish Home Army went to Moscow to discuss broadening the Provisional Government and were arrested.

43. Stalin and Katyn • Brutal and cynical as these actions were, might Stalin have done them had he not been a Communist? • The answer is, “Yes.”

44. Stalin and Czechoslovakia 1943 • Edouard Beneš was pro-Soviet (the Munich Pact somehow led many Czechs to be less than enthusiastic about the West) • December 1943, he signed a treaty with Stalin that guaranteed a coalition government with the portfolios of interior, defense, agriculture, and propaganda and education (McCauley 41-2)

45. Stalin and Hungary • As the Red Army liberated Hungary, a coalition government led by the rural Smallholders’ Party was formed. • Using “salami tactics,” in the phrase of Matyas Rakosi, the communists destroyed the coalition to take over. • This amounts to a unilateral solution

46. Stalin and Katyn • The Soviets first allowed a coalition National Democratic Front • By February 1945, Romanian communist violence led to the collapse of that government.

47. Stalin and Katyn • )Andrei Vyshinski gave King Michael 2 hours to name a new Prime Minister--Dr. Petru Groza, a Fellow Traveler. • This amounts to a unilateral solution

48. Stalin and Bulgaria • The population was generally pro-Soviet anyway, and the Fatherland Party government was soon in communist hands as the Red Army advanced.

49. The Churchill-Stalin “Deal” • Churchill proposes in 10/44 “spheres of influence” in the southeastern Europe • Romania USSR 90% Britain 10% • Bulgaria USSR 75% Britain 25 • Hungary USSR 50% Britain 50% • Yugoslavia USSR 50% Britain 50% • Greece USSR 10% Britain 90%

50. The Churchill-Stalin “Deal” • All of this may be interpreted in terms of traditional power politics rather than ideologically.