Commentary on Searle

1. Commentary on Searle David Florey

2. Fodor’s Commentary • On Robot’s • Why place the man inside instead of the computer? • This is not the right kind of causal linkage, but it’s tough to say what is • Causal relations of the right kind • Why is it that only our brains maintain causal relations? • How are thoughts made up of hydrocarbons so unique? • Can I not also hold that thought in some other form?

3. Fodor’s Commentary • On formal systems • What of the work in linguistics? • Searle claims that “no purely formal model will ever be sufficient for intentionality because the formal properties are not by themselves constitutive of intentionality” • But, our minds work over symbols • In other words our mental processes, our intentions use symbols • How can Searle claim that this is not a necessary condition for mental processing?

4. Haugeland’s Commentary • Focusing on the right causal powers • Searle’s Demon (a super fast man) • Performs according to the “right” causal powers • Can take the place of neuron communication • Can take the place of chlorophyll • Does he not have the “right causal powers?” • Of course he does • Searle skates a thin line when discussing the right “stuff” • Humans, or perhaps aliens – but NOT computers! • What about silicon-based aliens?

5. Haugeland’s Commentary • Original vs derivative intentionality • Original is intentionality “in its own right” • Humans have this • Searle argues that computers can never have this • Derivative is intentionality “borrowed from” something • Linguistic tokens have this • Computers/programs can also have this • Haugeland argues that semantically active states constitute the “right” causal power for original intentionality • Therefore, he argues, AI Systems can be intelligent

6. Hofstadter’s Commentary • Searle does not believe a soul can exist in a machine • And what of the formal systems that make us up? • Physics is a formal system and our brains work within this formal system • How can we have intentionality then if we are built on stuff that has none?

7. Hofstadter’s Commentary • And what of the little man? • This is an emotional ploy • You feel for the little man toiling hard all day to pretend he is a machine

8. Lycan’s Commentary • Behaviorism • If it walks and talks like a duck… • Species-chauvinistic view “functionalist” • Not good enough • It must process information in the same manner that we do as well

9. Lycan’s Commentary • Where is the understanding in this system? • You are too small, looking at the pipes and water • Forget the little man • What if the pipes were neurons and the water electricity? • While present day computers don’t have this capability • Nothing says future computers could not • The point is that present day computers are not forced through the same environment as us

10. Minsky’s Commentary • Decentralized Minds • We seem to have many minds (those that understand certain abstract terms and those that don’t) • Perhaps Searle’s model is too simple – where is the collaboration of the many minds? • Caution of Terminology • Using terms like “mean” and “intend” • One the one hand we understand these terms, but on the other its hard to draw a concrete representation • Caution of Bad Logic • Look to new empirical studies to better understand the discussion not only of AI • But also of our own minds