Free Will and Determinism

2. Free Will and Determinism • Determinism: given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law (all future facts are fixed). • Obvious threat to free will: if I am a physical thing, and physical things act in accordance with natural law, then everything I do is a function of (1) initial conditions and (2) natural law. • Different notion: fatalism: that certain events will happen no matter what you want or choose.

3. possible answers: • Incompatibilist views: • Hard Determinism: determinism is true, so no free will. • Libertarianism: free will is true, and so determinism is false. • Compatibilist view: • Soft Determinism: determinism is true, but we have free will.

4. Our focus: incompatibilism • What is it about determinism that threatens free will? 3 plausible views here. • If my life is already set in stone, then I am not in control of my life. • If my life is already set in stone, then my thoughts and efforts do not matters to how my life goes. • If my life is already set in stone, then for any action I do, I could not have done otherwise.

5. Determinism and Control • Idea: Determinism rules out being in control of your life, and being self-controlling is required for free will. • Seems like being in control of your choices is required. • But not clear whether determinism by itself means you are not self-controlling. Ex. Wumpus machine, etc.

6. Thoughts & Efforts Mattering • Idea: If the future of my life is determined, then none of my thoughts or efforts really matter. • Seems like thoughts, desires, choices, do matter to freedom. • Seems like fatalism implies thoughts don’t matter. Opposite for determinism. • On a materialist view of the mind… although dualistic minds could also be deterministic.

7. First problem with “could have done otherwise” argument • Idea: if true, determinism means that for any action, I could not have done otherwise. But if a decision is really up to me, I need to have been able to have done otherwise. So, determinism rules out free will. • 2 ways this argument seems problematic. • 2 importantly different senses of “could have done otherwise” • “could have done otherwise” doesn’t seem required.

8. 2 questions we might ask: • 1. “Could I have done otherwise, even if everything was exactly the same?” • This is certainly ruled out by determinism. • Being able to have done otherwise in this sense does not seem required for free choice; in fact, maybe this would rule out free will.

9. “Could I have done otherwise, if I had wanted to?” • This is not ruled out by determinism. • This does seem important for free will, but again determinism by itself doesn’t rule this out.

10. Second problem with “could have done otherwise” argument • Seems like there are cases where I could not have done otherwise, but actions are still free. Ex: the nefarious bioengineer.

11. Free Will / Determinism mismatch • Seems like the issue of free will might not depend on determinism at all. • Making my actions more a function of randomness can’t make them more “up to me.”