Theoretical Issues in Psychology

1. Theoretical Issues in Psychology Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Mind for Psychologists B&LdeJ

2. Aims of the book • Review of basic ideas and problems in philosophy of science and philosophy of mind, relevant for psychologists. •  Psychology as science of mind: • what is science? Chapters 1–5. • what is mind? Chapters 6–10. B&LdeJ

3. Chapter 1 Science: why and how? • Why science? • Knowledge • Arguments • Laws, theories, models and causes B&LdeJ

4. Why and how? Demarcating science: • science as arbiter of objectivity and truth; • demarcating science from pseudoscience; • science as safeguard against propaganda and superstition. Objectivity vs subjectivity or human construction: • realism, foundationalism, objectivism (positivism Ch. 3). • relativism (social constructionism, sociology of science Ch. 4 and 5). But what defines science? B&LdeJ

5. What defines science? • Reduction:underlying causal structure explains macro-phenomena; this research produces … • Unification;and promotes … • Systematicity. • Critical attitude:against authority and dogma; inspires freedom of thought, advances enlightenment and … • Open-mindedness. B&LdeJ

6. Theories of truth Traditional theories of truth: Correspondence theory of truth Coherence theory of truth ‘Recent’ theories of truth: Consensus theory of truth Pragmatic theory of truth B&LdeJ

7. Correspondencetheory: a statement or belief is ‘true’ if it corresponds with a situation, an event or an object in reality, or in the world (realism – objectivism) ‘There is a cat on the mat!’ => correspondence

8. Coherencetheory: a statement or belief is called ‘true’ if it is coherent with other beliefs (knowledge) that one has (idealism / relativism) coherent with ‘A cat is a mammal of the genus Felix; a pet animal, with a soft skin, that likes to be carressed etc., etc.’ ‘There is a cat!’

9. Consensus theory: ‘truth’ is a social or cultural consent or approval (relativism / social-constructionism) Pragmatic theory: a belief or theory is ‘true’ or reliable if it has success in practice; if it can be established by experience (experiments) ‘Recent’ theories of truth

10. Views on world & knowledge Realism: • world exists knower-independent; • world is primary; • knowledge pictures the objective world (representing); • truth is correspondence between knowledge and world. Relativism (an extreme version:Idealism): • world is (partly) constructed by the knower (subject); • subject is primary; • knowing is constructing; • truth is coherence with the rest of knowledge, or consensus. Pragmatism: • knowledge is functional and active, coping with the world; • truth is practically, experientially successful. B&LdeJ

11. A problem for realism: ‘God’s eye view’ How to compare the world with a theory, since one can never get outside one’s theory (opinion)? Irony: only in ‘God’s eye’ can correspondence be assessed. OK! Theory World correspondence B&LdeJ

12. Pragmatic realism Hillary Putnam (‘pragmatic realism’): ‘the mind and the world jointly make up the mind and the world’ (cf. Kant) ‘World’ World features Categories, interests B&LdeJ

13. Everyday knowledge and science • Eddington’s ‘Two Tables’: • molecules, empty, weightless, colorless; • visible, solid, colored everyday object. • What is the real table? Everyday world as illusion? Conclusion: different perspectives, both real • Everyday knowledge and scientific knowledge: • ‘manifest’ vs ‘scientific image’ (Sellars); • i.e. visible vs underlying, explanatory image • (bv. water – H2O; depression – dopamine) B&LdeJ

14. Characteristics of science • Systematicity:a coherent system of theories, statements, formulae etc. 2. Well-defined methods:methods specify what counts as legitimate problems, facts, solutions, etc. 3. Reduction:phenomena (or theories) are explained by underlying lower-level mechanisms (or laws). 4. Objectivity: in the sense of being controllable, reliable and inter-subjectively observable. 5. Clarity: scientific statements are phrased unambiguously, in principle addressed to the public domain. 6. Revisability:scientific knowledge is open, revisable at all times and never definitive. B&LdeJ

15. Induction, deduction, abduction Induction:from individual observations to general statements. No logical certainty, but new knowledge. Example: Lots of swans were observed; all were white. Maybe all swans are white. Deduction:from general statements to individual. Logical certainty: conclusion contained in premises, but no new knowledge. Example: All humans are mortal. Socrates is human. Therefore, Socrates is mortal. Abduction:inference to the best explanation. No logical certainty, new hypothetical knowledge about causes Example: All CJD patients ate beef. Beef may be the cause of CJD. B&LdeJ

16. The problem of induction Every generalisation can be disconfirmed by an unexpected observation (‘black swan’). Confirmation cannot, unlike deduction, be formalised; no logical certainty. Inducing requires classification; one has to start with concepts and criteria (e.g. for similarity). B&LdeJ

17. Facts and theories Facts: no such thing as pure observation; theory influences observation – ‘theory-ladenness’ Theory (coherent set of statements) indispensable: standard terms for description; coherent, unifying; ‘unobservable’ scientific concepts (e.g., energy, IQ) connected to observations by theory. Strict distinction between fact and theory impossible; hierarchy from factual to theoretical. B&LdeJ

18. ‘Justification’ vs ‘discovery’ Context of justification: normative, focus on method; prescribing criteria for holding a theory true, acceptable or justified, logically or empirically ( positivism). Context of discovery: description of the historical, social and psychological circumstances and influences that were relevant to the invention or discovery of scientific theories: who, where and when? ( more or less relativistic views of science). B&LdeJ