Highway & Motor Carrier Division Presented to:

Highway & Motor Carrier Division Presented to: SOUTHEASTERN STATES PUPIL TRANSPORTATION CONFERENCE and OKLAHOMA ASSOCIATION FOR PUPIL TRANSPORTATION Sheraton Oklahoma City Hotel Oklahoma City, Oklahoma July 11-13, 2011 Presented by: Bill Arrington General Manager, HMC

Highway & Motor Carrier Landscape Trucking 700K trucking companies in U.S (incl. 371K intrastate companies) 8.8M trucks operate in the U.S. (26M Class 1-8 trucks) 51K new motor carriers annually 61K HAZMAT truck companies 80% of U.S. communities depend on trucks for movement of commodities Highway Systems 46,876 miles of interstate highways 160K miles of NHS roads 4M miles of local roads 350 U.S. tunnels over 100 meters in length 582,000 bridges over 20 feet of span 100M commercial vehicles 154M automobiles 200M Licensed Drivers 10M Licensed Commercial Drivers 1.7M HAZMAT Drivers Motorcoach $5.6B industry: Scheduled Charter/Tour 3,200 bus companies 30K buses 118K jobs provided 62K full-time employees 750M passengers annually 95% are small operators (less than 25 buses) School Bus Pupil Transportation Industry Largest public fleet of vehicles in the U.S. (@ 500,000 school buses) 24M students transported daily School buses travel more then 4 billion miles annually 16,000 School Districts 2,500 private schools

Highway & Motor Carrier Four Security Pillars Information Sharing HighwaySecurity Process Exercises Security Plan Assessment Training Lessons Learned Assistance/Compliance

Highway & Motor Carrier • Public Law 110-53, (9/11 Implementation Act) requirements: • School Transportation Industry Assessment, Sec. 1538 • Scenario-based risk assessment – 64 page report. • TxVxC = Risk • There is currently no credible actionable threat to the school transportation industry • Forwarded to 46 School Transportation Representatives • Available upon request at: highwaysecurity@dhs.gov • Regulation requiring Over-the-Road Bus Security Assessments and Plans, Sec. 1531: This will require operator-level vulnerability assessments

Highway & Motor Carrier • School Transportation Industry Assessment • Findings: • School Buses are relatively easily obtained for use as a potential weapon. • As weapons, school buses provide a large capacity for explosives or other weapons and enjoy special, often unchallenged, access. • As targets, school buses are highly vulnerable and if attacked could have significant consequences and psychological damage. • “Insider threat” is a significant vulnerability (school bus drivers and/or maintenance workers). • A coordinated, national campaign of attacks could cause wide-spread secondary effects. Reduced school attendance as well as a negative resulting economic impact could occur. • School buses are often used as conveyances for persons other than students at major events and gatherings, which extend the security problem beyond just pupil transportation.

Highway & Motor Carrier • School Transportation Industry Assessment • Recommendations: • Vetting school transportation employees or contractors. • School districts should develop and implement a security planning process to include assessments, standards/guidelines, training and periodic exercises. • School transportation security planning and emergency planning efforts should include the entire pupil transportation system. Most school emergency plans stop at the school’s door. • School buses are used to transport passengers to many potentially sensitive targets. They are often afforded unchallenged access. Venues should be reminded to respectfully challenge a school bus’s legitimacy and presence to determine if they pose a security risk. • TSA should participate in identifying and developing a mechanism to facilitate the sharing of appropriate intelligence information with school officials and should compliment any threat information.

Highway & Motor Carrier • Assessments • HMC Corporate Security Review (CSR) Program designed specifically for the School Transportation industry • Total School Transportation CSRs = 42 • State Departments of Education CSRs = 5 Assessment Tools Currently Available: • Motorcoach Security and Emergency Preparedness Plan (SEPP) Self-Assessment, 2005 and the 2003 Volpe Study • Surface Transportation Vulnerability Assessment, US DOT, Volpe Center, October 25, 2001

Highway & Motor Carrier Security Plan • Security Plan Guidance: • National Congress on School Transportation: School Transportation Best Practices (Adopted May 2010) • Industry Associations and Common Industry Practices: NSTA Top 25 Security Program Action Items for School Bus Operations (2003) • TSA Security Action Items (SAIs) for School Transportation • TSA is working to produce this guidance document in 2011. • Categories: General Security; Personnel Security; Physical Security; En-Route Security; and Training and Exercises. • Planning Implementation: • Company or organization implementing their security plan with the ability to conduct exercises or drills to test the plan

Highway & Motor Carrier Training First Observer: www.Firstobserver.com(replaces the old Domain Awareness, Call Center and ISAC programs): 1-888-217-5902 • School Transportation Module: over 80,000 officials trained Current HMC Training Initiatives Available: • TSA: Counterterrorism Guidebook Flipcharts for School Bus Operations – Available to order from www.tsa.gov/highway • School Transportation Security Awareness (STSA) – DVD on www.tsa.gov/highway • HMC School Transportation Awareness Brochures and Driver Tip Cards (www.tsa.gov/highway - documents and reports tab)

Highway & Motor Carrier Exercises • TSA HMC conducts exercises using the Intermodal Security & Training Exercise Program (I-STEP): (Truck, Motorcoach, School Bus & Infrastructure) • 5 exercises conducted (over 50 school districts & some private carriers) • Nine Highway total exercises completed in calendar year 2009. Including the following two School Transportation exercises: • June 2009, Columbus, Ohio • July 2009, Greensboro, North Carolina • Conducted or planning ten total exercises for 2010 in the Highway modes. Including the following three School Transportation exercises: • March 2010 in Albany, NY • May 2010 in Los Angeles, CA – Los Angeles Unified School District • July 2010 in St. Louis, MO • Looking to conduct four School Transportation ISTEP exercise in 2011. Please contact TSA as soon as possible if you are interested.

Highway & Motor Carrier Exercises • TSA HMC I-STEP Results: • Best Practices: • The use of Fusion Centers is helpful for disseminating information. • Secondary Emergency (24/7) contact lists are critical for communicating information. • Annual security training customized for each position in a transportation agency is common. • There are often established relationships and clear communication chains between local districts and local law enforcement agencies. • There are a complex web of alternative means of sharing information (Regional Fusion Centers, First Observer, Association networks, etc). • State sponsored Alert Networks are a good tool for disseminating information to the school districts.

Highway & Motor Carrier Exercises • TSA HMC Lessons Learned from School Bus ISTEP exercises: • We looked at school districts both large, medium and small – some similarities and some differences. • 33 identified lessons learned included in our summary report. The following are some of the highlights: • Limited communication capabilities with bus drivers and they lack a reliable method for reporting activities up the chain. • No clear standard mechanism to successfully share information from federal level to local schools. • There should be an established process for communicating en-route security information, without alarming students. • There should be an established timeline or criteria to provide guidance on school district notification to law enforcement. • States should look at establishing Memorandum of Understandings (MOUs) and process to use the Video Messaging Service (VMS) for school bus transportation security incidents.

Highway & Motor Carrier Exercises • Lessons learned highlights (continued): • There needs to be more awareness of Fusion Center capabilities and authorization process. • There is limited communication between State Departments of Education and local law enforcement with the private schools. • Districts should be more proactive in passing information up to the State Departments of Education. • There should be better methods of information flow between school districts and school bus contractors. (formal government methods and potential informal commercial methods such as a transportation network (e.g. “Linked In” and “Facebook) accessed through cell phones, I Phones, etc.) • There is a lack of communication procedures and working relationships with all venues to which students go on field trips. • There is limited communication between modes (i.e. motorcoach, school bus, mass transit). • The classification and filtering of information makes it difficult to compile a picture of the common threat.

Highway & Motor Carrier Exercises • Lessons learned highlights (continued): • Formalize a process for law enforcement and fusion centers to pass higher level threat information against schools and school transportation to proper school districts. • There is a need to improve the communications between state governments, county and local districts. • There are inconsistent communications processes and procedures from the district level down to the schools. • There are no formal procedures for communicating information between adjacent districts. • Some districts have multiple law enforcement, municipal, or county jurisdictions to deal with which are difficult to manage. • Many school districts and school bus contractors need to strengthen relationships with local law enforcement (LE) so they may easily discuss and improve current school bus safety plans. • Schools are hesitant to report incidents that may reflect poorly upon the school district, preventing local LE from supporting school districts during incidents.

Highway & Motor Carrier Exercises • Lessons learned highlights (continued): • There is a limited capability and no standardization of school bus security on property. • There is a lack of standardization of school bus tracking and identification systems. • School districts need to apply for Department of Homeland Security (DHS) grants that would enable them to upgrade physical security measures on school bus lots, thereby increasing the security of school buses while unattended. • TSA should better inform school districts about the First Observer program and the training benefits it offers so that school bus security protocols can be improved upon and made more effective. • Each school district should require National Incident Management Systems (NIMS) and Incident Command System (ICS) training for employees filling school administrative and school bus operator roles so that they are more effective working within an ICS structure during an incident. • Each school district should create an ICS plan based upon NIMS and ICS principles to increase their ability to secure and control critical systems, infrastructures and facilities during an incident.

Highway & Motor Carrier Exercises • Lessons learned highlights (continued): • A threat level chart with Force Protection measures should be developed specific to school bus transportation. • All state and federal agencies should provide more recommendations on prevention/protection activities when disseminating intelligence in order to guide further district actions. • There is a lack of driver training for identifying, recording and reporting suspicious activity. • There is a lack of standard communications procedures for drivers to report progress. • There is a lack of transit agency representation in the Emergency Operation Center (EOC) and/or Incident Command Post (ICP). • There is a lack of clarity on authority to designate evacuation resources. • The procedures for communicating emergency information from government officials and emergency managers to bus operators lack efficiency. • HMC has completed a 2009-2010 Summary Report for School Transportation exercises. Available upon request at: highwaysecurity@dhs.gov

Highway & Motor Carrier Information Sharing • Government Coordinating Council (GCC) – Government Entities • Sector Coordinating Council (SCC) – Private Industry • Work on Policy, Planning & Programs using GCC/SCC Joint Working Groups • Quarterly Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC) meetings • School Transportation officials sit on both the GCC (NASDPTS) and SCC (NSTA) • Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) HMC Portal • HMC Tele-Conference Calls – Quarterly with each sub-mode • HMC webpage: www.tsa.gov/highway • HMC Email: highwaysecurity@dhs.gov

Highway & Motor Carrier POCs • Bill Arrington, General Manager Highway & Motor Carrier Security Division Office: (571) 227-2436 Cell: 202-253-9239 Email: william.arrington@dhs.gov • Ray Cotton, Assistant General Manager Highway & Motor Carrier Security Division Office: (571) 227-4237 Email: ray.cotton@dhs.gov • Steve Sprague, Branch Chief Programs and Initiatives Branch Office: (571) 227-1468 Email: steve.sprague@dhs.gov • Phil Forjan, Branch Chief Enforcement and Compliance Branch Office: (571) 227-1467 Email: phil.forjan@dhs.gov • David Cooper, Branch Chief Assessments and Measures Branch Office: 571-227-2609 Email: david.cooper1@dhs.gov • Paul Pitzer, Branch Chief Policy and Planning Branch Office: 571-227-1233 Email: paul.pitzer@dhs.gov Website: http://www.tsa.gov/highway Email: highwaysecurity@dhs.gov

Highway & Motor Carrier Division Presented to: