1 / 10

Crisis Bargaining (Russell Leng)

Crisis Bargaining (Russell Leng). V&H, Chapter 5. Research Questions. Do states learn anything from one crisis to the next? Are the bargaining tactics states employ affected by the outcomes and tactics of previous crises?. Definition of a Crisis. A situation that:

zoie
Download Presentation

Crisis Bargaining (Russell Leng)

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Crisis Bargaining (Russell Leng) V&H, Chapter 5

  2. Research Questions • Do states learn anything from one crisis to the next? • Are the bargaining tactics states employ affected by the outcomes and tactics of previous crises?

  3. Definition of a Crisis A situation that: • threatens the high-priority goals of the decision-making unit • restricts the amount of time available for response • surprises decision-makers by its occurrence

  4. Two Models of Crisis Bargaining Experiential Learning • The success or failure of the bargaining strategy employed in one crisis is likely to affect the bargaining strategy chosen in the next crisis. • Especially true in a second or third crisis with the same adversary

  5. Two Models of Crisis Bargaining Realpolitik Conflict Model • Emphasis on coercive diplomacy, or the use of threats and commitments to demonstrate resolve • Assumes that policymakers view failures in crises as a consequence of their own bargaining strategy

  6. Combined ELR Model Outcome of Preceding Change in Hypothesis Crisis Coercion 1 Diplomatic Victory No change 2 Diplomatic Defeat More coercive 3a Compromise (Satisfactory) No change 3b Compromise (Unsatisfactory) More coercive 4a War (Unwanted) More coercive 4b War (Premeditated) Less coercive

  7. Research Design • Data: 18 crises involving six pairs of states, each in 3 successive crises • Events tracking the disputants’ behavior coded (over 15,000 events) • Dependent variable: change in state A’s bargaining strategy from one crisis to the next

  8. Research Design • Influence Strategy (IS): • S = Same • +C = More Coercive • -C = Less Coercive • N = no identifiable strategy • Host (Mean Hostility Level): based on events in a crisis coded from –3 (most hostile) to +3 (most cooperative)

  9. Research Design Score: + indicates the case supports the hypothesis; – indicates that the case is contradictory to the hypothesis

  10. Conclusions • ELR Model predicts 18 of 24 cases correctly • More coercive predicted in 17 of 24 cases, but A was never the first to threaten the use of force in the 7 cases where A achieved a diplomatic victory or launched a premeditated attack. • The findings that successive disputes escalate and create further hostilities is similar to the idea of enduring rivalry.

More Related