Terrorist Threats, the European Union and Counter-Terrorism

1. CENTER FOR SECURITY STUDIES Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH Zurich) Terrorist Threats, the European Union and Counter-Terrorism Study Group on the Economics of Terrorism, 25 May 2006 Dr Doron Zimmermann (Cantab) FRHistS Senior Researcher

2. The Pillars of the European Union European Union Social and economic matters Foreign and security policy Justice and home affairs 1st 2nd 3rd

3. The Threat: An Overview There is clearly a terrorist threat emanating from within Europe and from regions contiguous to Europe. The current terrorist threat in Europe is multifold: • vestiges of political terrorism • separatist-irredentist terrorism is no longer as prominent, but certainly remains a potential threat • Terrorist elements emanating from expat communities constitute the single largest threat potential and arguably transcend the Islamist threat • in addition to FIS/GIA, SGPC (all AQ associates), HAMAS da’waa operations, Hezbollah (Lebanese (foreign operations branch) and Turkish), • IBDA-C and other AQ franchises, such as the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades.

4. European Threat Perception & Institutional CT Setup: Home • Europe and the Islamist Threat in Europe: Still perceived as a migration problem on elite political levels • Therefore treated as an “internal” problem within the EU and also on the level of domestic security policy in many EU member states • Thus an internal security, (frequently police) intelligence and law enforcement issue • No robust linkages with European Security and Defence Policy or the Common Foreign and Security Policy (except on the working level, e.g. the Third Pillar TWR (Terrorism Working Group) with COTER, the Second Pillar working group on counter-terrorism).*

5. European CT Practice: Abroad • The threat to Europe from within Europe (e.g. UCK/KLA, GIA, SGCP and other Al Qaida franchises) is usually clearly delineated from EU participation in “out-of-region” multilateral stabilization endeavors involving armed forces in classical counter-insurgency/counter-terrorism deployments > force protection (this is symptomatic of the artificial division between internal and external security) • These missions would be situated in the remit of the EU Second Pillar (the Common Foreign and Security Policy, including the European Security and Defence Policy), which is currently struggling to “speak with one voice” • However, the EU’s principal involvement in counter-terrorism beyond its borders is of a diplomatic and economic nature and frequently at loggerheads with USFP

6. European Conflict Resolution/Conflict Management • Second Pillar: Petersberg Tasks > Crisis Management and PSO • EU crisis management capability not devised with an eye to combating protracted insurgency • Early failures in EU crisis management endeavors have damaged the credibility of an autonomous, robust European role in crisis and conflict management • Operational CT benchmark: force protection

7. European CT Practice: Foreign Policy Weaknesses • The Second Pillar does not have any credible force projection capability, or internal institutional access to specialist resources (e.g. SOF or actionable intelligence assets). It can be argued that the EU has no robust executive security mandate • EU member states, rather than the EU, participate in multilateral missions in Afghanistan (ISAF) and Iraq (Coalition); when active abroad, EU missions tend to be dominated by key EU players, with a token participation by other member states or unilaterally as key member states of the Union • Concerning the ME, the EU is engaged in the so-called “Quartett” (U.S., Russian Federation, EU, UN), in which EU interests in the region are creating tensions with the traditional hegemon, the US • The EU maintains COTER, the CFSP’s counter-terrorism working group

8. Common EU CT Strategy: Assets There is: • An EU “anti-terrorism road map” of October 2001 (last update: 10 June 2005). • Common/European Arrest Warrant (mutual extradition treaty) • Joint Investigative Teams (investigative collaboration) • Eurojust (coordination of investigative endeavors) • Europol (coordination of intelligence and investigative support) • The Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism • More recently (25/3/2004 & 10/5/2005), the European Council adopted the “Action Plan on Terrorism” to better “fill the gaps” (update)

9. Common EU CT Strategy: Gaps There is not: • A democratically endorsed, obligatory and comprehensive, inter-Pillar EU counter-terrorism policy that is readily enforceable and provides for a solid CT policy basis, but instead there is close coordination on EU intergovernmental policy levels and enhanced cooperation among member states. • A robust, integrated and autonomous CT capability • An effective intergovernmental CT tool to replace pre-Third Pillar capabilities i.e. TREVI (Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extremisme, Violence Internationale)

10. EU CT Capabilities: The Problem (1) • Third Pillar/JHA: Europol, Eurojust, CAW. On an operational level, most European capabilities are vested in their member states’ security/intelligence, constabulary, military or paramilitary organizations: “The European Union (EU) is limited in its military and intelligence capabilities… NATO currently lacks the political will to embrace counterterrorism as a new mission, and the EU does not intend to build centralized structures and offensive capabilities that would be required.”

11. EU CT Capabilities: The Problem (2) • The CT Justice Model vs. the War Model (and the Integral Security Model) “[M]ost Europeans do not accept the idea of a ‘war’ on terrorism. They are used to dealing with this phenomenon with other methods (intelligence services, police, justice), and have not really taken in the consequences of the magnitude of the change wrought by the events of 11 September 2001.”

12. EU CT and the Radicalization of Diasporas • The presence in Europe of fifteen million Muslims… • Washington is quick to conclude that it is the presence of this population that leads to a ‘timid’ reaction to terrorism in Europe… • The US is overlooking the fact that European governments must prevent a radicalisation of this immigrant population… • This immigrant population is often far less well integrated in European societies than Muslims in the United States.

13. The Role of EU Institutions: Rhetoric and Operational Reality • Many EU institutions dealing with CT are engaged in coordination, legal harmonization and policy shaping endeavors on an intergovernmental (as opposed to supranational) level, i.e. CT in the EU is held on a tight leash, which suggests that the prevalent view remains that CT today is the prerogative of national governments • Even the EU organization rightly or wrongly assumed the most operational, i.e. Europol, is essentially an intelligence and investigation coordination body – a facilitator • On an elite policy level, the transatlantic divide over Iraq and future bones of contentions have the potential to move beyond rhetoric and turn CT cooperation sour; on the operational level, this divide is not as yet seriously affecting functional collaboration and, hopefully, will not have an impact in the future.*

14. Dilemma: CT via EU or NATO?/ WMD and EU/NATO • NATO is not geared toward the combating of low-intensity political violence • Within NATO, CT is primarily viewed as a “strategic” asymmetric threat, e.g. sub-state actors acquiring CBRN weaponry • The EU can bring to bear many specialist civilian CT assets, but has no credible military force projection capability • EU member states, however, do have specialized intelligence, constabulary, military and paramilitary organizations and are able to field operational assets up to and including military task forces

15. Linkages: CT, OC and Migration • Pre-9/11: The EU does see a strong correlation between migration and organized crime, but is reluctant to acknowledge a connection between immigrants and terrorism; • Post-9/11: The “Hague Program” (the EU Commission’s forward agenda for the EU), however, situates integration within the security and justice issues on the EU Agenda • The salient long-term effect of this institutional perspective is that it has contributed to the “criminalization” and concomitant de-politicization of terrorism; • For these reasons, and notwithstanding a flood of statements to the contrary (incl. the EU CT Strategy), terrorism and related issues, including the radicalization of diasporas, are barely, if ever, acknowledged as a national security-level threat (N.B.: The UK perspective constitutes a notable exception, also with a view to internal/external security linkages)

16. Countering the Radicalization of Diasporas: Integration or Inclusion? • “Integration” is resisted by many because of associations not with a two-way process of mutual adaptation, but with assimilation. • “Inclusion” emphasizes the responsibility of society to open up to the excluded, and is the goal identified for long-term residents. • The EU has national action plans on social inclusion for the population as a whole – why not use the same term for migrants? (Sarah Spencer, “The Challenge of Integration in Europe”)

17. Preliminary Conclusions (1) • While it is understood that the “EU is not the United States of Europe” (Gijs de Vries, May 2004), the robust integration of robust CT capabilities constitutes a sine qua non for successful multilateral CT activity • This prerequisite for the implementation of a sustainable, successful counter-terrorism policy is defined by the requirements deriving from the current transatlantic terrorism threat assessment (transition of AQ from group to network to mass movement, sub-state actor use of WMD) • It takes a network to fight a network, but if the network you are fighting is better integrated and less constrained, you have a problem • The robust CT requirement iterated above is at loggerheads with the realities of the EU member states’ political interests (sovereignty issues, operational security, and particularism)

18. Preliminary Conclusions (2) The only feasible alternative is: • A) a return to full-fledged intergovernmental collaboration, i.e. the de-institutionalization of TREVI, while investing it with a robust mandate, or • B) the creation of an alternative multilateral CT forum (e.g. TREVI, Club of Berne, Kilowatt Group or PWGOT, or ideally a UN CT organization) or independent or semi-independent institution (e.g. FATF, ITC > international terrorism court), both of which are politically exclusive (a “club”) • Practical experience suggests that institutionalization of European CT collaboration may offer accountability and be more democratic, but precludes the requisite flexibility offered by informal case-by-case bi- and multilateral collaboration (legitimacy vs. efficiency), i.e. on the intergovernmental level. • Institutionalization of European CT presupposes unprecedented political will and a broad consensus to abrogate sovereignty and accept restrictions on the expression of national interest with respect to “internal” security issues

19. Fitting Epigram for European Union Counter-Terrorism Endeavours? • “He has all of the virtues I dislike and none of the vices I admire.” Sir Winston Churchill on Sir Richard Stafford Cripps Did Sir Winston presage a future united Europe’s ability to act in concert in vital policy areas, when he coined this quip?

20. Contact Information Dr Doron Zimmermann (Cantab) FRHistS Senior Researcher The Political Violence Movements Project Center for Security Studies Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH Zurich) Electronic Mail: zimmermann@sipo.gess.ethz.ch Telephone: +41 (0) 44 632 07 58