Presentation by the Ministerial Task Team to the Portfolio Committee.

1. Presentation by the Ministerial Task Team to the Portfolio Committee. DEPARTMENT OF SOUTH AFRICAN CORRECTIONAL Parliament :Cape Town 20 February 2007 POLICE SERVICE SERVICES

2. To report to the portfolio Committee the outcome and the findings of the investigation conducted by the Ministerial Task Team surrounding the circumstances of the escape of awaiting trial offender Ananias Mathe from the Pretoria C-Max Correctional Centre. PURPOSE OF THE REPORT.

3. To thoroughly investigate the circumstances leading up to and around the escape of inmate Ananias Mathe from Pretoria C-Max Correctional Centre on Saturday 18 November 2006, through interviews of inmates and members, including where appropriate, the use of polygraph testing and investigation of the facility and the escape route. To make findings and recommendations on: possible disciplinary steps, possible criminal charges, improvements to physical security, improvements on monitoring and internal controls, improvement of immediate post escape or escape attempt investigation by DCS, improvements in relation to the security competencies and vetting of C-Max personnel and any other matters that they identify as warranting recommendations. TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR C-MAX INVESTIGATION TASK TEAM.

4. To submit an interim report on its findings and recommendations to the Minister of Correctional Services by 4 December 2006; and To submit a final report by not later than 31 January 2007. TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR C-MAX INVESTIGATION TASK TEAM.

5. COMPILATION OF THE C-MAX MINISTERIAL TASK TEAM.

6. A) Investigative Team: The Investigative Team was tasked with conducting interviews and obtaining statements of DCS officials and inmates. The team was further tasked to conduct polygraph tests on DSC officials and a lifestyle analysis of the DCS officials who were on duty on the day of Mathe's escape. METHODOLOGY.

7. B) Security Systems and Audit Team: The Security Systems and Audit Team was tasked with conducting a security appraisal of the state of security at C-Max in Pretoria. The focus was on perimeter security, manning levels and the electronic security systems. The team visited Kokstad (Ebongweni), Bloemfontein (Mangaung) and Makhado (Kutama Sinthumule)maximum correctional facilities in order to use these as a benchmarking tool in making a comparative security analysis with Pretoria C-Max correctional Centre. METHODOLOGY (Cont.).

8. C ) Policy and Standing Operational Procedure Team: The Policy and Standing Operational Procedural Team was tasked with identifying the relevant policies and standing operational procedures relevant for the execution of duties by DCS officials based at C-Max, in order to assess the level of compliance with these. METHODOLOGY (Cont.).

9. The team focused on the events prior to the day of the actual escape. The events on the actual day of the escape. Possible post-escape aiding. SCOPE OF INVESTIGATIONS.

10. Conducted 40 structured interviews. Obtained 29 sworn statements. Conducted lifestyle analysis of DCS officials. Conducted Polygraph testing of some officials. Conducted communication analysis. INVESTIGATIONS TECHNIQUES.

11. Ananias Mathe made four attempts to escape: The first attempt happened on 30 April 2006 when he caused damage to Cell 90 in Section A5. The second attempt occurred from Cell 29, Section A6. The third attempt, from Cell 25, Section A6 followed the same modus operandi as the attempted escape from Cell 29 in Section A6. The fourth attempt from cell 49, Section A6 (13 November 2006) made use of the same modus operandi used in Cell 25, Section A6. EVENTS PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL ESCAPE.

12. On 13 November 2006 at about 24:00 the responsible official was summoned to the C-Max Correctional Centre as a result of Mathe having damaged Cell 49 in Section A6, in which he was held. An instruction was issued that Mathe be removed from Cell 49 to Cell 4 in Section A6. EVENTS PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL ESCAPE (Cont.).

13. During the morning meeting of the shift reporting for duty at 07:00, all officials were informed of the damage caused by Mathe to Cell 49 of Section A6 and that for this reason he was placed in Cell 4, Section A6 on the same night. A search was conducted on the morning of 14 November 2006: Cell 4 of Section A6 (Mathe’s cell) the upper catwalk window inside the cell was allegedly loose by approximately 2mm and it was allegedly reported to the security Manager. Telephone records also indicated that the entries made in the prescribed telephone recording register of phone calls made by offender Mathe at A6 section were not correlating with the actual records obtained from Telkom. EVENTS PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL ESCAPE (Cont.).

14. The shift pattern on 18 November 2006 consisted of a 06:00 – 14:00, a 14:00 – 22:00 (First Watch), a 22:00 – 06:00 (Second Watch) as well as a day shift that commenced from 07:00 – 16:00. Four(4) officials reported for duty at A6 Section and they were responsible for the daily routine of unlocking, inmate showering, breakfast, exercise, lunch, supper and locking of inmates – between 07:30 and 15:00. EVENTS ON THE DAY OF THE ESCAPE.

15. The personnel distribution on the day and time of the alleged escape was as follows: Member in charge. Main gate (Portal area). Phase 1 (Section A5 and A6). Phase 2 (Section A1, A2, A3 and A4). Tower posts 2 and 5. A - Catwalk (Only one official). PERSONNEL DISTRIBUTION.

16. The following posts were not manned: Watch towers 1,3 and 4. C-Catwalk (Member on A-Catwalk also had to patrol the C-Catwalk). UNMANNED POSTS.

17. At approximately 21:50 whilst on A-catwalk duty an official discovered that the cell monitoring window of Mathe's cell was removed and lying next to its opening. Official in charge was immediately notified and the escape alarm was raised. An EST officials had discovered the broken window leading from the catwalk onto the roof. A rope and iron bars were discovered in close proximity to Tower 2. DISCOVERY OF MATHE’S ESCAPE.

18. Two possible routes of escape was investigated: The probable route. The alternative route. ROUTE OF ESCAPE.

19. Mathe forcibly removed the cell monitoring window. Mathe forced him through the opening onto the catwalk and/or was aided by being pulled up on to the catwalk. Mathe moved down the catwalk towards the door that leads to the roof of the exercise area. Mathe removed a number of louvre window panes. Mathe climbed through the frame of the window. PROBABLE ROUTE OF ESCAPE.

20. Mathe moved over the roof of the exercise area. Mathe possibly jumped onto the ground. Mathe headed towards Tower 2. Mathe probably scaled the perimeter wall close to Tower 2 and/or exited through an unmanned Tower 2. Mathe finally made his escape over the chain link fence. Mathe was picked up by a getaway vehicle in close proximity to the Correctional Centre. PROBABLE ROUTE OF ESCAPE(Cont.).

21. Mathe was removed from his cell, possibly by the official in charge of A6 Section. Mathe was escorted from section A6 through the passage leading past Section A5 to A1. Mathe had to be loaded by some means of transport at the portal main gate or escorted through the C-Max perimeter exit point. Mathe if escorted by foot had to be loaded by vehicle in the main parking area. Mathe should have been offloaded close to the correctional centre or the city centre. Mathe was picked up by a getaway vehicle in close proximity to the Correctional Centre/City Centre. ALTERNATIVE ROUTE OF ESCAPE.

22. Operational security measures Non-compliance with procedures such as the reporting of security breaches, key control measures, shift handing over procedures and catwalk patrol. Completion of Journals – search register & telephone register: Non Compliance with set Institutional Orders. Stereotype entries. Entry times. Handover Procedure -Non Compliance with set Institutional Orders. Auditing and Inspecting of Journals - Poor/Lack of Managerial Supervision. POLICY AND STANDING OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES.

23. The prevailing weather conditions at the C-Max Correctional Centre between 15:00 and 18:00 were characterized by a heavy downpour of rain. This heavy rain falling on the corrugated roof structure in combination with the broadcast of the match on the radio hampered audibility and visibility. Critical areas such as the catwalk passages, the towers and the perimeter area lack any form of electronic movement, monitoring and detection system. NON-HUMAN FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TOWARDS THE ESCAPE.

24. The following areas of non compliance were identified: The responsible official failed to conduct proper and regular visits to all sections and posts. This failure to visit Sections and Posts has resulted in a delay in the detection, discovery and raising of the escape alarm that could have either prevented the escape or ensured the immediate arrest of Mathe. FINDINGS.

25. The members did not comply with the key control procedure and shift handing over procedure to the Official in Charge of the Second Watch on 18 November 2006. The official on the catwalk failed to inspect whether the damage to the catwalk view mirror above Mathe's cell was either repaired or remained damaged. The catwalk member’s failure to properly perform his duties has resulted in a delay of the discovery of the escape and the alarm being raised earlier. FINDINGS (Cont.).

26. The non-compliance with regard to the execution of duties in relation to the Tower 2 observations during the First Watch on 18 November 2006 has aided in the escape of Mathe. The official failed to properly perform her duties, which has resulted in her not detecting the escape on the rooftop while approaching Tower 2 in the execution of the escape. This failure resulted in a delay of the escape alarm being raised and the possible immediate re-arrest of Mathe. DCS officials have in certain instances fraudulently manipulated entries and non-compliance with the completion of the Daily Activity Registers, Section Journal, Movement Control Registers and the Head of Centre Journal on 18 November 2006 and before. This non-compliance and fraudulent manipulation of the official documentation could also be viewed in some instances as a deliberate attempt to have covered up the discovery of the escape. FINDINGS (Cont.).

27. That internal disciplinary procedure/action be instituted for non-compliance with duties that aided the escape of Mathe. The immediate institution of a dedicated team to assess and oversee the viability of the latest technological security system and security organizational models as well as the implementation thereof. That NIA and SAPS Crime Intelligence further investigate the possible corruption and bribery of DCS officials that could have aided in the escape of Mathe. That SAPS pursue criminal charges against the DCS officials who through gross negligence aided in the escape of Mathe. RECOMMENDATIONS OF TASK TEAM.

28. Thank you! Building a caring correctional system that truly belongs to all !