Transforming Defense

1. Transforming Defense “The Path Not Taken …yet” • The Role of Defense in National Security • The Management of Defense • The Force Vision: Broad and Sustained Competitive Advantage Arthur K. Cebrowski Director, Force Transformation 23 July 2003

2. Expanding Competition Power and Principle Strategic Posture Shrinking the Dysfunctional, Disconnected Gap of Globalization Operational Maneuver Creating a one-two punch Mapping Future Challenges Risk Issues: How to make near-term actions robust across alternative futures? How to create on-ramps for capabilities? Connecting the Present to Our Future

3. Information Age • Short Cycle Time • New Competencies • Adaptive Planning • Integrated Joint • Interdependent Globalization III Globalization II • Emerging Rules • Market Opportunities • New Customer Base Emerging • Security=All Else+Defense • Developed Rules • Mature Markets • Narrowing Customer Base • Security=Defense Industrial Age • Long Cycle Time • Well Developed Tools/Processes • Deliberate Planning • Deconflicted Joint • Tortured Interoperability Trends in Security Competition

4. Policy Outcome = f {Power, Moral Principle, Strategic Interests} U.S. power is unmatched Therefore, U.S. policy will be attacked through its moral principles (legitimacy, international law, etc.) If the frontiers of National Security can be everywhere and are not territorial borders but fault lines within societies, then … The nexus of foreign and domestic security policy is intelligence We must be able to look and operate deeply within societies Assured Access includes the domains of political victory Speed of modern warfare creates a continuum, not a succession of phases Intensity Assure, Dissuade, Deter Decisively Defeat Duration Expanding Competition

5. Security System Balance?… Major Movements Strategic Maneuver/Balance Forces forward Strategic deploy from home Allies Operational Maneuver From forward garrison From the sea From strategic distances Deter Forward 2d derivative force Sustaining force Constabulary/Nation-building force

6. Strategic Posture… Exporting security The Red Zone … … Our Response

7. Global Trends … Military Response The Emerging American Military: • More expeditionary (including lighter, more lethal) • More networked (more interoperability at the JTF level) • Designed to leverage the exterior positions (precision from distance as sensors move in) • Leverages increasingly persistent ISR • Tighter sensor-shooter timelines (sensing, C2, fly-out) • Values Information Superiority (information operations) • Expanded unmanned capabilities(UAV, UCAV, UUV, robotics) Information Age Iraq 2 Globalization II Globalization III Iraq 1 Industrial Age

8. System State Individual Global Trends…Threats …Strategic Response Strategic Capabilities: • More Preventative - Less Punitive • Achieve unambiguous warning earlier • More SOF-Like characteristics • A Deter Forward Force • An Intel/Surveillance-based force • Coping with system perturbations Information Age Globalization II Globalization III Industrial Age

9. Volunteer (Recruited) Force Professional Citizen Soldier Warrior + Enforcer + “Systems Administrator” Projecting Power Exporting Security Event Focused Continuous Punitive Preventative Access to Battlespace Access to Political Victory Policy Outcome = f {Power, Moral Principle, Strategic Interests} Top Level Issues …Culture: Values, Beliefs, Attitudes

10. Warfare Elements Fire - Non-lethals, Directed Energy, Redirected Energy Maneuver - Sea basing, vertical battlefield, lift for operational maneuver Protection - Urban Operations, “Bug-to-Drug” Cycle Time C2&C – Joint Interdependency vs. Interoperability ISR - Demand-centered Intel, Tactically Responsive Space Logistics - Joint demand-centered logistics Risk Management Areas (creating on-ramps) Joint S&T Joint Experimentation Modern Warfare Modeling Tools People: cost or resource Precision Deterrence Policy Outcome = f {Power, Moral Principle, Strategic Interests} Candidates for Action Now …Identify issues of regret

11. Surrogate Wars System Perturbations and Consequences Global HomelandInterests Security MADContainment 1990 2000 Global HomelandInterests Security Precision Deterrence? Transforming Defense => =>

12. Tons of bombs required to drop a bridge span (90% confidence) Then & Now:One-sixtieththe tonnage required to drop a bridge span All weatherB-1 JDAM4 Tons B-17240 Tons F-4D200 Tons F-4D LGB12.5 Tons F-117 LGB4 Tons 250 200 150 Tons Required 100 50 0 1940s 1960s 1970s 1990s 2000s Evolution of Precision Strike: … Effectiveness against fixed targets

13. Then & Now: Sorties required to neutralize 10 mobile armored battalions * * Damage 15 out of 30 armored vehicles per battalion Unguided Unitary Bombs Unguided Cluster Weapons Sorties required Maverick SFW WCMD/SFW/P3I 1940s 1960s 1970s 1990s 2000s Evolution of Precision Strike: … Effectiveness against mobile targets

14. Then & Now: Over Three Orders of Magnitude reduction in weapons required to destroy a fixed target Advanced weapons systems armed with precision munitions are extremely accurate but are highly dependent on quality information Evolution of Precision Strike:… Quantity of bombs assigned for 90% Probability of Kill 9,000 Bombs1,500 B-17 Sorties3,300' CEP 176 Bombs88 F-4 Sorties400' CEP 2 Bombs1 F-16 Sortie10' CEP 1 Bomb1 B-2 Sortie< 10' CEP 1970s 1940s 2000s 1990s

15. Large Area Affected Makes up for Lack of Precise Weapon and Target Location Non-Linear Political Consequences Self Deterring Precise Weapon and Target Location Allows Focused Effects Militarily Relevant Operationally Useful Weapons of Mass Destruction (Nukes) Weapons of Precision Deterrence Paradigm Changes … To Enable Precision Deterrence Precision Deterrence = f {Power, Moral Principle, Strategic Interests} Ours & Ours & Ours & Theirs Theirs Theirs

16. Context Dependent Highly reliant on intelligence A state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction relevant to those we wish to deter An Effects Based Operation Precision Deterrence: creating a precise local effect in the cognitive domain Ways can be military, financial, economic or diplomatic The Duality of Means … û Viewed as Viewed asDisproportionateProportionateby the Target by the World  PrecisionEffect Deterrence is … Precision Deterrence must have a local effect – it can have a global impact

17. Directed Energy Weapons Lasers Covert engagement at a safe distance All aspect engagement and re-targeting capability Ultra precise targeting and aimpoint Adjustable delivered energy High Powered Microwaves Deter belligerents Ultra precise targeting and aimpoint Deny an area to personnel Control crowds Non-Lethal Weapons Counter-Personnel Counter-Material Counter-Capability Need for decision space and time Ability to act while discriminating intent Increase engagement time and range Need to satisfy policy and operational constraints Target Non-combatants Own force Military Options … for Precision Deterrence Operational Commonality?

18. Precision Deterrence … Issues and Choices How do we balance local (tactical) deterrence and global (strategic) deterrence? What kind of JWAC-like process is required to create cognitive effects? Can our intelligence community identify that which our adversaries hold most dear? What are the new tools of deterrence that support our moral principles and strategic interests and how do they interact? What are the new concepts for deterrence?